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The buyer needs a hundred eyes, the seller not one.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Warranties and disclaimers of warranties may be regarded as elements of
risk allocation between buyers and sellers. Sometimes used as bargaining
chips, disclaimers enable a seller to curtail liability for goods sold and a buyer
to acquire goods at a favorable price. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
1Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. J.D., 1973, New
York University School of Law.
2GEORGE HERBERT, THE WORKS OFGEORGE HERBERT 334 (F.E. Hutchingson ed., 1972).
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(UCC) regulates disclaimers of express warranties3 and implied warranties4 in
sale-of-goods contracts. Of the implied warranty disclaimer subsections, the
one allowing disclaimers by course of dealing or performance, and by usage
of trade is the least definitive.5
This article calls for the rethinking of subsection 2-316(3)(c), the course of
dealing, course of performance, and trade usage disclaimer provision. The
statutory formation of Article 2 requires elsewhere that, if applicable, any or all
of these three factors must be considered when interpreting an agreement.
6
Enactment of this second, separate provision should have directed courts to a
more equable construction of implied warranty disclaimers of dealing,
performance, and usage. This provision should have guided practitioners to a
more reliable understanding of the requirements of such disclaimers. Not only
did this provision do neither, but it also blurred the distinction between
disclaimers by this method and more concrete disclaimer techniques. The
many judicial opinions in which the courts have failed or refused to effectuate
2-316(3)(c) as written demonstrate that this provision is superfluous.
Consequently, removal of this statutory provision is quite justifiable.
3U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1992). The section provides:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the pro-
visions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202)
negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction
is unreasonable.
Id.
4U.C.C. §§ 2-316(2) and (3) (1992). Those sections provide:
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty
of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchant-
ability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or
modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing
and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is
sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend
beyond the description on the face hereof."
U.C.C. § 2-316(2).
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are
excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other language
which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion
of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods
or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the
goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examin-
ation ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing
or course of performance or usage of trade.
U.C.C. § 2-316(3).
5 See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
6 See infra part V.
[Vol. 41:1
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/3
DIMINISHING RETURNS
A reconsideration of this subsection is timely. In 1988 the Permanent
Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code and the American Law
Institute together with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws authorized a study to determine if Article 2 should be revised.7 On
March 1, 1990, these bodies issued a Preliminary Report calling for significant
revisions.8 The Study Group which authored the Report suggested no changes
for subsection 2-316(3)(c) and no other authorities or scholars have
recommended modifying the provision.9
In its call for improvement with regard to implied warranty disclaimers
through course of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage, this article
suggests a change in form, not substance. This article proposes the deletion of
2-316(3)(c) and, as in other Article 2 sections, posits the use of Code Comments
to emphasize the importance of what this subsection comprises. 10 Such a
change would comport with the goal of Code drafters "to simplify ... and
modernize the law [of] commercial transactions.' 11
II. SCOPE OF U.C.C. § 2-316
Section 2-316 of the Code, titled "Exclusion or Modification of Warranties,"
consists of four subsections.12 Only the first three describe instances in which
exclusions or modifications of warranties are given statutory recognition.
Express warranty disclaimers are treated in subsection 2-316(1),13 while
paragraphs (2) and (3) control implied warranty disclaimers. 14 These last two
subsections overlap because they authorize exclusions or modifications of both
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.15
Paragraph (3), however, uses the terms "implied warranties" and "implied
7 pERMaNENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY
GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2 PRELIMINARY REPORT (1990).
8Id.
9See A.B.A. Task Force, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981 (1991). But cf.
Cheryl R. Eisen, Don't Confuse Us With the Facts?: The Relevance of the Buyer's Knowledge
of a Written Exclusion of an Implied Warranty Which Is Inconspicuous As a Matter of Law
(U.C.C. § 2-316(2)), 15 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 297, 312 (1991) (suggesting that dealing,
performance, and usage implied warranties not be permitted to apply to written sales
contracts).
10See infra part VII.
11U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(a) (1992).
12 U.C.C. § 2-316 (1992).
13 See, U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1992).
14 See, U.C.C. § 2-316(2) and (3) (1992).
15Although the statute itself specifies only "fitness" rather than fitness for a particular
purpose, Comment 4 of U.C.C. § 2-316 indicates that the latter was intended.
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warranty," more expansively since neither phrase restricts the kinds of implied
warranties to which it applies.
Paragraph (3) of subsection 2-316 is also more tenuous than paragraph (2).
While 2-316(2) imposes a conspicuousness requirement for disclaimers of
implied warranties of merchantability, and a writing and conspicuousness
requirement for disclaimers of implied warranties of fitness, subsection (3) has
no such standards. Its introductory language, however, has persuaded some
authorities that it is independent of or superior to subsection (2).16
Nevertheless, a greater number of cases, involving either claims or defenses
based on disclaimer issues raised by subsections (2) and (3), do not observe this
arguable superiority.17 More significantly, those decisions fail to accord
2-316(3)(c) the stature it merits within the disclaimer structure of the section.18
There is scant legislative history to aid in the interpretation of course of
dealing, course of performance, and trade usage. The only policy consideration
disclosed in the history of what eventually became section 2-316(3) is buyer
protection. 19 As the section evolved, evidence of the significance, if not
superiority, of the future subsection (3)(c) emerged. 20 What did not emerge,
however, was an explanation of the grammatical change from its original
language. While the precursor to section 2-316(3) placed usage of trade first in
the usage, dealing, performance sequence, the order later changed to reflect
16 See, e.g., Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp. 268 A.2d 345, 351 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1970); seealso Stream v. Sportscar Salon, Ltd., 397 N.Y.S.2d 677,682 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1977) ("[Tjhe implied warranty of merchantability remained in effect by virtue of
subsection (2) unless subsection (3) came into effect."); cf. Special Project, Article Two
Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1276 (1987)
("By its terms, section 2-316(3)(a) seems to undermine entirely 2-316(2)'s disclaimer
requirements."). But see, e.g., Lecates v. Hertrich Pontiac Buick Co., 515 A.2d 163, 169
(Del. Super. Ct. 1986) (rejecting the position that paragraph (3) outweighs paragraph
(2)).
17See infra part IV. A-B.
18See infra part M11.
19See, e.g., National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, REVISED
UNIFORM SALES ACT § 41 INFORMAL APPENDIX, THIRD DRAFT 1943, (Tentative Sketch of
Material for Comment). The language in the APPENDIX states that the "desired limitation
or exclusion be so called to the buyer's attention as to make the resulting understanding
unambiguous." Id. This language is reflected in the la st sentence of Comment I to U.C.C.
§ 2-316. That sentence reads: "[This section] seeks to protect a buyer from unexpected
and unbargained language of disclaimer by denying effect to such language when
inconsistent with language of express warranty and permitting the exclusion of implied
warranties only by conspicuous language or other circumstances which protect the
buyer from surprise." Id.
20See ALI PROC. 147 (July 1, 1943 - June 30, 1944). Miss Soia Mentschikoff stated:
"[W]e also recognize the prevailing power of the custom in the individual trade, or the
usage of the trade which is involved." Id.
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2-316(3)(c)'s form. 21 Usage of trade now follows course of dealing and course
of performance.
Subsection (3)(c) has a counterpart in U.C.C. § 2-314(3).22 By authorizing the
creation of implied warranties by course of dealing and trade usage, the
subsection parallels the buyer protection concept of 2-316(3). Unaccountably,
2-314(3) omits course of performance as a basis for the creation of an implied
warranty. This is particularly curious if one considers that through course of
performance the parties' intentions unfold as the phases of a single sales
transaction progress, typically in an installment contract, and continued
performance can reveal the nature of implied warranties existing at the time of
agreement. By the same logic, course of performance can reveal that no implied
warranties were included in the bargain or, more deliberately, that implied
warranties were excluded. The drafters' reasons for permitting disclaimers of
implied warranties but not their creation by course of performance is a
mystery.23
Exclusions and modifications of warranties under section 2-316 must be
distinguished from limitations of remedies for breach of warranty.24 Although
subsection 2-316(4) authorizes such limitations, it references other controlling
sections in Article 2.25 Some courts have combined the two concepts, equating
limitation of remedy with disclaimer of warranty.26 While superimposing the
remedies limitation provisions on the disclaimer of warranties provisions may
not always be harmful, they were not intended to be equivalents. 27 It can be
2 1See supra note 19; Elizabeth S. Kelly, 2 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFMS 32
(1984).
22 Section 2-314(3) states: "Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied
warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade." U.C.C. § 2-314(3)(1992).
23 Cf. Richard A. Lord, Some Thoughts About Warranty Law: Express and Implied
Warranties, 56 N.D. L. REV. 509, 583-84 (1980) (suggesting that course of performance
may not provide a "clearly shown" creation of warranties or that it may be subsumed
within course of dealing).
24 WIIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316 (1992).
25 The section provides in pertinent part: "Remedies for breach of warranty can be
limited in accordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of
damages and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719)." U.C.C.
§ 2-316(4)(1992).
26 See J. D. Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davis Co., Inc., 351 N.E.2d 243, 246 (Ill. App. Ct.
1976). ("This remedy [of recovering damages for breach of contract] may be excluded
or modified under section 2-718 and 2-719. Section 2-316(4)."). The court then concluded
that in itself the contract language limiting what damages plaintiff could recover
excluded an implied warranty. Id.
27Comment 3 to 2-719 explains the excluding of consequential damages by implying
that the issue can be avoided altogether if the seller chooses to disclaim warranties
according to 2-316. Nowhere else in the Comments, either to 2-316 or 2-719, does the
juxtaposition of these two sections appear. Comment 3 therefore gives some guidance
on this point by indicating that a disclaimer has to comply with the standards of 2-316.
19931
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argued that just as 2-316(3)(c) has been misapplied or deemphasized despite
the statute's clear language, failure to regard the limitation of remedies
provisions as separate from the disclaimer section contravenes the policy of
following the parties' intentions at the time of the contract, especially in those
instances in which warranties were intended. If warranties are found to be
excluded by course of dealing, course of performance, or trade usage, it must
be clear that the parties agreed to the disclaimer at the time of the contract.28
III. FEATURES OF U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(C)
At first glance the use of "and" as a connector between (a), (b), and (c) of
2-316(3) might signify an inclusive or cumulative application of the subsection.
A closer reading of the statute and its Comments indicates the error of that
conclusion. Comment 6 characterizes (a), (b), and (c) as "exceptions to the
general rule" which "are common factual situations" giving notice to the buyer
of warranty disclaimers. 29 It does not preclude circumstances in which only
one of the subsections might apply. There is a basis of comparison elsewhere
in Article 2 which clarifies the structure of this subsection. Implied warranties
may be created in any manner consistent with U.C.C. § 2-314. Subsection (2)
lists six ways in which goods may be found to be merchantable 30 and, like
2-316, connects each category with the conjunction "and." Comment 7 to 2-314
specifically directs that paragraphs (a) and (b) "are to be read together." Lacking
a similar instruction, 2-316(3) may be regarded as excluding warranties
through any one or more of its paragraphs. Although Comment 7 to 2-316 does
28 See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
291n its entirety Comment 6 to U.C.C. § 2-316 provides:
The exceptions to the general rule set forth in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of
subsection (3) are common factual situations in which the circumstances
surrounding the transaction are in themselves sufficient to call the buyer's
attention to the fact that no implied warranties are made or that a certain
implied warranty is being excluded.
U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 6 (1992).
30Subsection 2 states:
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may
require; and
(f) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(1992).
[Vol. 41:1
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link (a) and (c) by describing the terms in (a) as a "particularization of paragraph
(c),"31 it does not make them interdependent.
Courts have recognized the efficacy of a seller's conduct in disclaiming
implied warranties pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b)32 despite the indefiniteness
of situations to which they might apply.33 While debate surrounds the
construction of 2-316(3)(a), 34 and recommendations have been made for its
revision,35 judicial decisions demonstrate that (3)(c) suffers from as much, if
not greater, confusion.36
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF U.C.C. § 2-316(3)(c)
A. Effective Disclaimers
In approximately half of the cases examined for this article in which the
seller's claim or defense rested on paragraph (c), the courts found an effective
disclaimer.37 Judicial validation of implied warranty disclaimers by the
application of this provision, however, suggests an unfounded persuasiveness.
311n its entirety Comment 7 to U.C.C. § 2-316 provides:
Paragraph (a) of subsection (3) deals with general terms such as "as is,"
"as they stand," "with all faults," and the like. Such terms in ordinary
commercial usage are understood to mean that the buyer takes the entire
risk as to the quality of the goods involved. The terms covered by paragraph
(a) are in fact merely a particularization of paragraph (c) which provides for
exclusion or modification of implied warranties by usage of trade.
U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 7.
32 See K & M Joint Venture v. Smith Intern, Inc., 669 F.2d 1106 (6th Cir. 1982) (showing
defendant might have prevailed in disclaiming implied warranties by the use of "as is"
but for circumstances negating that conclusion); Tarulli v. Birds in Paradise, 417
N.Y.S.2d 854 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (satisfying all the requirements of 2-316(3)(b)
effectively excluded the implied warrantyof merchantability). But see Nettlesv. Imperial
Distributors, Inc., 159 S.E.2d 206 (W.V. Sup. Ct. 1968) (holding an opportunity to inspect
did not preclude implied warranty since defect could not have been revealed by
reasonable inspection).
33JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 12-6 (1988).
34 See Eisen, supra note 9 at 302. Janet L. Richards, "As Is" Provisions-What Do They
Really Mean? 41 ALA. L. REv. 435 (1990).
35 See A.B.A. Task Force, supra note 9.
36 See infra part IV. A-B.
37 E.g., Country Clubs, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1394 (6th Cir. 1970)
(holding course of dealing or course of performance was the basis of implied warranties
disclaimer in purchase of golf carts); Earl Brace & Sons v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 708 F. Supp.
708 (W.D. Pa. 1989) (holding course of performance in a contract for the purchase of
herbicide established a disclaimer arising from a conspicuous limitation of
consequential damages clause); Hummel v. Skyline Dodge, Inc., 589 P.2d 73 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1978) (purchasing of cars wholesale was on an "as is" basis supporting trade usage
implied warranty disclaimer); Torstenson v. Melcher, 241 N.W.2d 103 (Neb. 1976)
(holding usage of trade proved that sale of bull was made without implied warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose); Kincheloe v. Geldmeier, 619 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App.
19931
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In certain decisions, use of 2-316(3)(c) to disclaim an implied warranty was
supportive of or an alternative to another basis for exclusion or modification
of warranty. For example, the court in Earl Brace & Sons v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.38
determined that a limitation of consequential damages clause which satisfied
section 2-719 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code, and about which
the buyer should have known through previous use of the herbicide,
constituted a disclaimer arising through course of performance. 39 The court
does not cite a specific paragraph of 2-316. It finds instead the limitation's
conspicuousness along with course of performance as sufficient reasoning. It
is a general, almost indiscriminate, approach to the issue of warranty
disclaimer. Quoting from the Comments pertaining to express warranties and
holding the disclaimer valid because of the absence of an express warranty
likewise does little to particularize the basis of the disclaimer.40 Additionally,
the court's choice of course of performance rather than course of dealing to
describe the plaintiff-buyer's previous use of the herbicide adds to the overall
imprecision.
The Comments to section 2-316 recognize a connection between (3)(a) and
(c).41 Applying subsection (3)(a) to neutralize the effect of (3)(c) altogether,
however, as the court did in Hummel v. Skyline Dodge, Inc.,42 is an extension of
paragraph (3) beyond what the drafters may have intended. The court in
Hummel found further support for permitting the warranty exclusion in
(3)(b):4 3 defendant-buyer had examined the vehicle before its purchase and
could have availed himself of sophisticated equipment for the examination.44
Three cases in which 2-316(3)(c) arguably served as the sole basis of a
disclaimer are illustrative of both the courts' unease and, to a lesser extent, their
lack of confidence in relying on the provision. Country Clubs, Inc. v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.45 involved the purchase of motorized golf carts by
plaintiff whose president was an attorney, experienced in business. The
plaintiff made two purchases from defendant in six months. Before the initial
purchase, plaintiff's president had considered operating a dealership for
defendants' carts and had received a dealership agreement containing a
warranty disclaimer. Although plaintiff chose not to become a dealer, the order
1981) (holding purchase of livestock "as is" excluded implied warranty of
merchantability through trade usage).
38708 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
3 9 d. at 710.
40Id.
41See U.C.C. § 2-316 cmts.
42589 P.2d 73, 75 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
43Id.
44 d.
45430 F.2d 1394 (6th Cir. 1970).
[Vol. 41:1
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forms which plaintiff subsequently used incorporated by reference the
warranty disclaimer in the dealership agreement.46 Holding that course of
performance or course of dealing "could be the basis for a limitation of implied
warranties,"47 the Sixth Circuit agreed with the district court. Communications
between the parties, the buyer's experience, and a lawyer's acceptance of the
limited warranty provisions contained on the order forms were factors which
justified a disclaimer based on 2-316(3)(c).
The noteworthy aspect of this court's decision is the tacit validity it accorded
the written disclaimer in the dealership agreement.48 At the center of the
"factual situation"49 forming the basis of a disclaimer under paragraph (3) was
the written limitation communicated by the dealership agreement.50 Despite
the court's determination that it was unnecessary to examine the language in
the agreement, the facts adduced by the district court, and with which the
circuit court agreed,formed the "factual situation" which the latter court held to
be "within the meaning of course of performance ... or course of dealing."51 A
crucial finding of fact was the "notice or chargeable knowledge" of the
disclaimer in the dealership agreement.52 Thus, a seemingly ineffectual written
disclaimer which could not survive alone became capable of giving notice to a
buyer and thereby giving life to a poorly-developed disclaimer by course of
performance. By failing to comment on its conformity with any standard of
2-316 while relying on the writing's existence, the court minimized (3)(c).53
461d. at 1395-97.
471d. at 1394.
48WHITE and SUMMERS characterize the court's action as "judicial willingness to
uphold an imperfectly drafted disclaimer clause." WHITE & SUMMERS supra note 33, at
512.
49430 F.2d at 1397.
501d.
5lid.
52Id.
53The court's omission appears to be an implication of uncertainty about the
subsection. Addressing this point, the Texas Supreme Court reversed a grant of
summary judgment on the ground that a written disclaimer, although failing to satisfy
2-316(2), could form a course of dealing. Actual knowledge of a disclaimer arising from
the parties' dealings would render the writing's inconspicuousness irrelevant. See Cate
v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Tex. 1990); see also Velez v. Craine & Clarke
Lumber Corp., 341 N.Y.S.2d 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 305 N.E.2d
750 (N.Y. 1973) (holding actual knowledge of disclaimer on invoices in the trade
rendered it "sufficiently conspicuous."). But see Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble
Robinson, Co., 625 P.2d 171,175 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (holding actual knowledge of a
disclaimer pursuant to 2-316(3)(a) "is insufficient to give it effect."). In its preliminary
Report the U.C.C. Article 2 Study Group recommends that actual knowledge operate
to validate implied warranty disclaimers irrespective of their conspicuousness.
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, supra note 7, at 106
(Part 3, Rec. A2.3(13)(B)); Eisen, supra note, 9 at 307. But see A.B.A. Task Force, supra note
1993]
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The written disclaimer does not comply with 2-316(2). There is no mention
of the word "merchantability" and, despite bold lettering, the question of
conspicuousness remains. Notice to the buyer, therefore, must turn on the mere
fact of the limiting language itself. If the court had said as much, it would have
explicitly acknowledged (3)(c)'s authority in this instance through the
mechanism of a writing sufficiently capable of imparting notice to a buyer.
Instead, course of performance or dealing pursuant to (3)(c) and the written
limitation emerge as coequals. The failure to distinguish between course of
performance and course of dealing by finding "elements of both" is additional
evidence that the court was indecisive in its interpretation of (3)(c).54
A more precise interpretation came from the district court in Standard
Structural Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.55 Plaintiff purchased cable from
defendant for use in erecting bridge spans. When the cable broke during
removal of the old spans, plaintiff initiated suit against the manufacturer
alleging, among other things, breach of implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose. In finding for defendant, the court
concluded that a sixty-two year business relationship between the parties
showed a course of dealing in which plaintiff, through its prior purchases,
became fully aware that defendant excluded such warranties. 56 That
awareness resulted, in part, from defendant's practice of sending confirmatory
letters and acknowledgements in which unequivocal language, in bold letters,
specifically excluded both implied warranties.5 7 Unlike Country Clubs, the
court in Standard Structural placed no emphasis on the written disclaimer
despite its apparent compliance with 2-316(2) and 1-201(10).58 Although the
9, at 1110-11 (defending the view that the conspicuousness requirement should not be
replaced by an actual knowledge standard).
54 Comment 2 § 1-205 gives these terms "equivalent meaning[s]" after it has been
established that the parties' conduct precedes or succeeds the agreement in question.
On this point Country Clubs was silent.
55597 F. Supp. 164 (D. Conn. 1984).
561d. at 185-86.
5 71d. at 173-74.
58U.C.C. § 1-201(10) (1992) provides:
"Conspicuous": A term of clause is conspicuous when it is so written
that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have
noticed it. A printed heading in capitals (as: NON-NEGOTIABLE BILL
OF LADING) is conspicuous. Language in the body of a form is "conspicuous"
if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color. But in a telegram any stated
term is "conspicuous". Whether a term or clause is "conspicuous" or not is for
decision by the court.
Id.
It is of course noteworthy that sixty-two years of business dealings in which the
parties' actions repeatedly demonstrate their intentions is a more substantial indicator
than six months and two purchases. In the former case course of dealing assumes a
regularity that either side would find difficult to contradict.
[Vol. 41:1
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court recognized alternative grounds of no implied warranty of fitness absent
the satisfaction of criteria required by U.C.C. § 2-31559 and no breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability,6° its declision rested squarely on
2-316(3)(c).
While the three ways of excluding or modifying an implied warranty
pursuant to 2-316(3)(c) are distinct,61 only usage of trade requires that its
existence and scope be proved as facts.62 Trade usage, once determined by the
trier of fact, should, depending on the circumstances, automatically give rise
to or disallow a disclaimer. The occasional failure of this formula in the context
of implied warranty disclaimers63 supports this article's proposal for a
reconsideration of the matter.
One case in which the formula worked was Torstenson v. Melcher.64 Plaintiff's
suit to recover the purchase price and damages for breach of warranties
resulting from the sale of a nonperforming bull failed, despite its reliance on a
catalogue warranty stating, among other things, that the animal was a breeding
animal. 65 Plaintiffs objected to defendants' pleading a trade usage exclusion of
the implied warranty of fitness and the trial court's instruction to the jury on
that issue. In upholding the trial court's judgment for defendants, the Nebraska
Supreme Court found that defendants' answer had satisfied the requirement
of 1-205(6) in placing plaintiffs on notice of their intent to offer evidence of a
trade usage.66 Further, the court declined to overturn the judgment below in
view of the jury's authority to render the verdict.67
59597 F. Supp. at 186. Section 2-315 states:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the
goods shall be fit for such purpose.
U.C.C. § 2-315 (1992).
60597 F. Supp. at 187.
61See supra part II.
62 See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
63 See infra part IV.B.
64241 N.W.2d 103 (Neb. 1976).
65 d. at 104.
66 d. at 106.
67 d. at 107. The court did not equivocate on the formula despite its own doubts. It
held, "[wihile we may have some question on the result herein, the trial was held in a
farm and ranch community. It was a question of fact for the jury. We are bound by its
determination."
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B. Ineffective Disclaimers
Courts have given effect to implied warranty exclusions because of
2-316(3)(c), often equivocating on the subsection's precise meaning. They have
likewise held exclusions under this subsection to be ineffective.68 Two cases in
which the courts refused to recognize implied warranty disclaimers present
straightforward rules for examining (3)(c).
In Latimer v. William Mueller & Son,69 defendant sold kidney bean seed to
plaintiffs for planting. Affixed to the bags in which the seed was packaged were
three tags, one of which contained a disclaimer of warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose. When the seed plants developed a bacterial
disease reducing crop yield, plaintiffs sued the retailer who in turn sued the
supplier.
The Michigan trial court ruled in plaintiffs' favor, denying defendant-seller's
motion for a directed verdict on the issue of breach of an express warranty.70
The court also denied the third party defendant-supplier's directed verdict
motion based on the disclaimer tags attached to the seed bags.71 On appeal the
appellate court found no express warranty and reversed the judgment in favor
of defendant-seller on the issue of express warranty.72
The court, however, rejected the third party defendant supplier's argument
that no breach of warranty of merchantability occurred because the seeds were
not warranted against disease. Instead, the court agreed with the trial court,
holding that an implied warranty arose from course of dealing and usage of
trade.73 Neither 2-316(2) nor (3)(c) effectively disclaimed the warranty. The
language on the tags was "insufficiently conspicuous " 74 and, while similar tags
68 See, e.g., Bodine Sewer v. Eastern Illinois Precast, 493 N.E.2d 705, 710 (Ill. App. Ct.
1986) (holding the express warranty in the sale of concrete pipe was not affected by any
disclaimer of implied warranty based on trade usage); Christopher & Son, Inc. v. Kansas
Paint & Color Co., Inc., 523 P.2d 709, 716 (Kan. 1974) (finding an implied warranty
disclaimer based on course of dealing would have no effect unless known to the buyer
at the time of the contract for steel primer paint); Latimer v. William Mueller & Son, Inc.,
386 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (finding evidence insufficient to establish
trade usage as a disclaimer of warranty in the sale of seed); see also Lutz Farms v. Asgrow
Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding a disclaimer contained in invoice sent
after purchase of onion seed was ineffective to exclude an implied warranty of
merchantability).
69386 N.W.2d 618 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
70Id. at 621.
71ld.
721d. at 622.
73Id. at 623.
74386 N.W.2d at 624.
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were used in the seed trade, that fact did not establish a trade usage
disclaimer.7 5
The court accepted plaintiffs' arguments that they had not read or noticed
the tags.76 Consequently, no "mutual understanding" as to the disclaimer had
come about.77 Although the court did not state that an undisputed trade usage
would have made the lack of understanding immaterial and the disclaimer
effective, U.C.C. § 1-205(5) makes this inference clear.78
The Latimer court, however, did not address the issue concerning when the
disclaimers reached plaintiffs. The third party defendant-supplier shipped the
seed to defendant-seller more than a year after plaintiffs had placed their
orders. By implication, the understanding would have had to arise at the time
of the contract, but the court found no such understanding.79
In Christopher and Son, Inc. v. Kansas Paint & Color Co.,80 the Kansas Supreme
Court affirmed the lower court, expressly observing that a written disclaimer
was inadmissible if made after the date of the contract.81 Defendant, the lowest
bidder on a contract to provide steel primer paint to plaintiff, sent invoices
containing disclaimers of all warranties after plaintiff had placed orders.
Because the parties had done business for years, and because the contract in
question entailed sixteen orders, defendant asserted an exclusion of warranties
through course of dealing and course of performance. 82
The court rejected a finding of exclusion based on course of dealing because
of the buyer's ignorance of the limitation at the time of the contract. 83 Likewise,
no disclaimer resulted from course of performance because the writing which
7 5 d. at 625.
76Id.
77 d. at 625.
78 Compare Latiner with Torstenson v. Melcher, 241 N.W.2d 103,107 (Neb. 1976) ("'In
determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a judgment, every controverted
fact must be resolved in favor of the successful party, and he must have the benefit of
every inference that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence."' (quoting Ridenour
v. Kuker, 175 N.W.2d 287, 288 (Neb. 1970)).
79 Other courts ruling on seed cases have explicitly denied a summary judgment
motion or rejected a disclaimer under paragraph (3) on the grounds that it is not part of
the bargain when the writing containing it is sent after the contract of sale. See, e.g.,
Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 625 P.2d 171,175 (Wash. Ct. App.
1981) ("Without negotiation and agreement, no disclaimer ... can be effective."); see also
Lecates v. Pontiac Buick Co., 515 A.2d 163, 170 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986) ("[T]he more
immediate problem with the invoice disclaimer is whether it was delivered to plaintiffs
after the contract for sale had been made.").
80523 P.2d 709 (Kan. 1974).
81id. at 716.
821d. at 715.
831d. at 716.
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would form its basis was not conspicuous. 84 Thus, with regard to (3)(c) the
court examined the issue of disclaimer from two separate perspectives: (1)
failure to apprise plaintiff of the disclaimer at the time of the contract rendered
a course of dealing exclusion inoperative, and (2) failure to satisfy 2-316(2)'s
conspicuousness requirement negated a course of performance exclusion. 85 On
the latter point the court, in regard to course of performance as dependent upon
paragraph (2), implied that performance was an inferior criterion.
Course of performance remains the weakest link in the disclaimer chain for
implied warranties. It has no meaning until events have unfolded after the
contract of sale, and then it is used to reconstruct the moment of contract.
Course of dealing and trade usage operate in a proactive direction to determine
if an implied warranty disclaimer should be given effect, while course of
performance operates retroactively. Few courts have been precise in construing
the application of a course of performance disclaimer and this vagueness
undermines the clear language of both 2-316(3)(c) and 2-208.86
C. Course of Dealing, Course of Performance, and Usage of Trade as Parol Evidence
When the contract is in writing but does not include a written disclaimer, or
an effective written disclaimer, a seller's assertion of warranty exclusion under
2-316(3)(c) may conflict with the Code's parol evidence rule.87 Section
2-316(3)(c) is two steps removed from section 2-202. Paragraph (a) of section
2-202 permits a written contract to be explained or supplemented by course of
dealing or performance or usage of trade. Implied warranty disclaimers arising
out of those factors will in turn be allowed to clarify a written contract.
84 Id. at 717.
85 The court said as much: 'This rule [requiring disclaimers to be made at the time
of the contract] would not apply in a situation where the seller was attempting to use
the disclaimers subsequently made known to the buyer to create a defense of'course of
performance."' 523 P.2d at 716.
86 See Country Clubs, Inc., v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1394, 1397 (6th Cir.
1971); see also Earl Brace & Sons v. Ciba-Greipy Corp., 708 F. Supp. 708, 710 (W.D. Pa.
1989), (arguing "course of performance" while describing course of dealing); Robinson
v. Branch Moving and Storage Co., Inc., 221 S.E.2d 81, 84 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (finding
buyer who refused to inspect a used truck sold "as it was," and the only subject of the
sale, could not recover costs because of an effective implied warranty disclaimer based
on course of performance).
87 See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1992). That section states:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties
agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties
as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are
included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement
or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplement-
ed (a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by course of
performance (Section 2-208); and (b) by evidence of consistent additional
terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
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Courts view the admissibility of supplemental evidence from course of
dealing, course of performance, and trade usage in the light of three criteria.
First, if a written contract is ambiguous, there will be no bar to the introduction
of extrinsic evidence such as usage of trade.88 Second, if a writing is
unambiguous by virtue of its language, or by the inclusion of a merger clause
which does not constitute a complete expression of the parties' agreement
(contrary to the intention of the party who prepared it), parol evidence which
is consistent with the writing may be introduced.89 Third, a contract which
shows a purported final expression of the parties' agreement will be effective
to exclude the introduction of parol evidence if it is clear from the language that
the court should not consider extrinsic evidence.90
The criteria are not absolute and debate centers on two fronts. When does
evidence contradict the agreement? And, when will trade usage, course of
dealing, and course of performance be admissible despite the possible
appearance of total integration?
Case decisions disagree on the meaning of contradictory evidence.91 Of
greater significance, however, is the question of whether the parol evidence
rule can ever exclude course of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage
evidence. Courts have observed that course of dealing and trade usage are not
terms of the contract but are assumed to be a part of it.92 Thus, they can never
be inconsistent with the contract in contravention of the statutory language
which calls for the consideration of consistent additional terms. 93 A merger
clause which purports to exclude all extrinsic evidence and is meticulous in its
language may yet fail carefully to negate course of dealing, usage of trade, and
88See Ashland Oil Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
89 See Nanakuli Paving and Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981);
Morgan v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 663 P.2d 1384 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
90 See, e.g., Nanakuli, 664 F.2d at 782 n.14 (commenting that a boilerplate clause in
defendant-appellee's contract "should not have operated to exclude all dealings
evidence for any purpose, unless the parties had evidenced a clear intent to contract
with no reference whatsoever to such evidence.").
91See, e.g., State ex rel. Conley Lott Nichols Machine Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 671
P.2d 1151, 1155 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (reasoning trade usage evidence is contradictory
to the agreement if it would change its basic meaning). But see American Research
Bureau, Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating the test for
contradiction is a "stricter standard requiring a substantially greater agreement between
the contract and the proffered additional terms").
92 See, e.g., Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3, 10-11 (4th Cir. 1971).
93 See generally Roger W. Kirst, Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subversion of the
UCC Theory, 1977 U. ILL. L. F. 811, 833 ("[Slubsection 2-202(a) is primarily an internal
cross-reference to emphasize that section 1-205 provides the rule governing usage of
trade and course of dealing. The 'may not be contradicted' phrase and subsection (b)
are not applicable to evidence of usage of trade and course of dealing at all.").
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course of performance.94 The statute does not offer examples of what would
constitute a careful negation, although use of explicit language covering these
three factors would seem to suffice.95
In the context of the Code's parol evidence rule, no landmark case appears
to address the introduction of implied warranty disclaimers based on course
of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage. A conundrum exists. If a
disclaimer of warranty is a contract term while evidence of a trade usage,
course of dealing, or course of performance is not, which concept prevails? If
2-202(b) governs all disclaimers, those arising from 2-316(3)(c) could be in
conflict with the written contract, and the application of the parol evidence rule
would conform to judicial interpretation similar to the above. The statutory
definition for "term" would seem to apply96 in that a disclaimer is a part of an
agreement which must be bargained for.97 If subsection 2-316(3)(c) did not
exist, disclaimers of implied warranties by trade usage, course of dealing, and
course of performance would continue to be effective because of 1-205 and
2-208.98 Because those sections are capable of producing disclaimers, the
potential for conflict between 2-202 and the subject matter of 2-316(3)(c) would
not be eradicated. 99 However, an absence of case law on this issue raises the
possibility that the trade usage itself, or the course of dealing or performance
controls. If what the trade usage comprises, such as a disclaimer, is secondary,
exclusion under the parol evidence rule may be inapplicable. A judicial
resolution, if not a statutory comment on this point, is in order.
94 Comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-202 provides:
Paragraph (a) makes admissible evidence of course of dealing, usage of
trade and course of performance to explain or supplement the terms of any
writing stating the agreement of the parties in order that the true under-
standing of the parties as to the agreement may be reached. Such writings
are to be read on the assumption that the course of prior dealings between the
parties and the usages of trade were taken for granted when the document
was phrased. Unless carefully negated they have become an element of the
meaning of the words used. Similarly, the course of actual performance by the
parties is considered the best indication of what they intended the writing to mean.
Id.
95But see Kirst, supra note 93, at 864-68 (arguing that forms which mention explicitly
course of dealing and usage of trade may be inadequate if they do not reflect the "intent
of the parties and their agreement in fact.").
96U.C.C. § 1-201(42) (1992) provides: "'Term' means that portion of an agreement
which relates to a particular matter." Id.
97U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1992) makes a disclaimer of an express warranty inoperative if
it conflicts with 2-202. The negating or limiting of a warranty, a disclaimer, is, by this
section, recognized as a term.
98 See infra part V.
99 But cf. Eisen, supra note 9, at 312-13 (arguing course of dealing, course of
performance, and trade usage should not be permitted to act as disclaimers but should
be limited to an "interpretive function" so as not to violate the parol evidence rule).
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V. SCOPE OF U.C.C. §§ 1-205 AND 2-208
By declaring that "a course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade
in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or
should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an
agreement,"100 paragraph (3) of section 1-205 can be a controlling device in any
sale-of-goods contract. 101 Similarly, course of performance "shall be relevant to
determine the meaning of the agreement."102 The statutory language, therefore,
clearly mandates the consideration of course of dealing, usage of trade, and
course of performance when interpreting a contract of sale. Because 1-205 and
2-208 are instruments for detecting parties' intentions and expectations after a
dispute has arisen, disclaimers of implied warranties are thereby subject to
discovery. In accordance with this reasoning, Comment 1 to 1-205 supports the
argument that the Code's parol evidence rule did not contemplate the exclusion
of course of dealing and trade usage.103
Courts have examined the effectiveness of trade usage and course of dealing
in disclaiming implied warranties without reference to 2-316(3)(c). In Velez v.
Craine & Clarke Lumber Corp.,104 plaintiffs sued a lumber supply company for
personal injuries sustained when a plank on which they were standing
collapsed.lOS Judgment in their favor was reversed on appeal. The appellate
court held that actual knowledge of invoice disclaimers of an implied warranty
of fitness gained over fifteen years of dealings with the defendant, combined
with the conspicuousness of the written disclaimer in question, made the
disclaimer operable. 106 This case may be compared with Brace,107 in which the
court likewise ruled that the written disclaimer was conspicuous and that
course of performance strengthened the disclaimer's effectiveness. The court
100U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1992) (emphasis added).
10 1The Code distinguishes between "agreement" and "contract" in section 1-201;
however, the sale contract is predicated on the existence of an agreement. See U.C.C. §§
2-204(1) and (2) (1992).
102U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1992) (emphasis added).
103 Comment 1 to U.C.C. § 1-205 provides:
This Act rejects both the "lay-dictionary" and the "conveyancer's" reading
of a commercial agreement. Instead the meaning of the agreement of the
parties is to be determined by the language used by them and by their action,
read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and other surrounding
circumstances. The measure and background for interpretation are set
by the commercial context, which may explain and supplement even the
language of a formal or final writing.
U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 1 (1992).
104341 N.Y.S.2d 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
1051d. at 249.
1061d. at 252.
107Earl Brace & Sons v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 708 F. Supp. 708 (W.D. Pa. 1989).
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in Brace cited 2-316 generally in its opinion, quoting from Comment 1.108 By
implication alone, 2-316(3)(c) was made applicable. Neither the majority nor
the dissenting opinion in Velez cited 2-316(3)(c); the former, by citing 2-316(2)
only, narrowed its statutory focus to that subsection. It may be argued that a
similar omission of any reference to 1-205 does not weaken its role. Course of
dealing and trade usage are fundamental to an agreement.
Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co.109 reached a decision contrary to that in Velez.
Plaintiffs, commercial onion growers, had purchased seed from
defendant-seed company following a business relationship between the parties
covering more than a decade. During that time plaintiffs had experienced no
serious difficulty with seller's seed. When the crop in question yielded
deformed onions attributed to genetic defects in the seed, plaintiffs sued,
claiming negligence, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.110 Following
judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appealed to the Tenth Circuit. With respect
to the warranty issues, defendant asserted that the district court had erred in
submitting evidence of warranties to the jury when it should have granted
defendant's motion for a directed verdict.111 Leaving unchanged the trial
court's finding that the written disclaimer was inconsistent with express
warranties contained in defendant's publication,112 the court affirmed for
plaintiffs. The court cited both subsections 2-316(1)113 and (2).114 In dicta, the
court examined the prior dealings between the parties, finding no disclaimer
on that basis. 115 As in Velez, the court cited neither 2-316(3)(c) nor 1-205.
The courts in both Velez and Lutz Farms considered the buyers' knowledge
in reaching their decisions.116 Therefore, removal of 2-316(3)(c) need not
undermine courts' appreciation of the need for great care in assessing the
parties' understanding with regard to their sales contract. 117
More generally, courts have incorporated and applied 1-205 and 2-208 into
their decisions without recourse to other provisions specifically recognizing
course of dealing, performance, or trade usage. Decisons have supported a
108Id. at 710.
109948 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1991).
1101d. at 640.
111Id. at 644.
112ld.
1 13/d.
114948 F.2d at 646.
1151d.
116 See id.; Velez v. Craine & Clarke Lumber, 341 N.Y.S.2d 248, 252 (N.Y. App. Div.
1973).
117See Special Project, supra note 16, at 1283.
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buyer's rejection of goods,118 determined a seller's entitlement to a price
increase, 119 approved interest charges on overdue invoices, 120 and found a
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability.121 All of these actions, along
with exclusions, modifications, or limitations of implied warranties, were
within the formulation of 1-205 and 2-208. In addition to the clear language of
these sections, policy reasons exist which call for the refinement of implied
warranty disclaimers through course of dealing, course of performance, and
trade usage.
VI. POLICY ARGUMENTS
A. The Experience Factor
If sellers and buyers were generally knowledgeable about their rights and
liabilities at the time a contract is made, a provision like 2-316(3)(c) could be
beneficial to a seller and harmless to a buyer. Many contracting parties,
however, including merchants, do not possess the level of knowledge or
experience to justify subsection 2-316(3)(c).
Article 2 of the Code applies to contracts for the sale of goods irrespective of
the status of the parties.122 While the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act provides
additional protection to consumers in cases of written warranties,123 and
legislation in many states regulates other aspects of consumer sales, 124 Article
2 has broad application for those states which have adopted it as officially
written. Anumber of states have amended 2-316 to prohibit or restrict warranty
118GNP Commodities, Inc. v. Walsh Heffernan Co., 420 N.E.2d 659 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981);
Harper & Assoc. v. Printers, Inc., 730 P.2d 733 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
1 19Southwest Indus. Import & Export, Inc. v. Borneo Sumatra Trading Co., 666 S.W.2d
625 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
120 Southwest Concrete Prod. v. Gosh Constr. Corp., 263 Cal.Rptr. 387 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989), affd, 798 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1990).
121 Delano Growers' Coop. Winery v. Supreme Wine Co., Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1066 (Mass.
1985).
122 See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1992). The section provides:
Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions
in goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although in the form
of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate
only as a security transaction nor does this Article impair or repeal any
statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or other specified classes of
buyers.
Id.
12315 U.S.C. § 2301 (1992).
12 4See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 2451 (1991) (prohibiting unfair deceptive trade
practices in consumer transactions).
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disclaimers in the case of consumers. 125 But merchants are regarded as a
general class and are assumed to need no such protection.
Courts have often approached disclaimers with caution, observing explicitly
or otherwise that disclaimers are disfavored. 126 They have likewise considered
experience and business acumen in deciding the effectiveness of implied
warranty disclaimers 127 despite the Code's omission of these factors in its
general regulation of sales transactions. 12 8 Since nothing in the statutory
language of 2-316 indicates that this section was intended to evaluate the
parties' relative business experience, 12 9 unlike sections such as 2-314 in which
the warranty of merchantability exists because of the seller's status and by
implication the seller's experience, 13° courts have taken this factor into account
125See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 7-2-316(5) (1975) (providing that seller's liability for damages
for personal injury may not be limited in the case of consumer goods); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (1991) (providing that exclusions of implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness, and limitations on a consumer's remedies for breach are
unenforceable); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 106, § 2-316A (1992) (requiring that section 2-316 is not
applicable to sales of consumer goods or services); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 382-A:2-316(4) (1983) (requiring that in a consumer sale disclaimers of warranties of
merchantability or fitness are ineffective to limit a merchant's liability unless buyer has
signed a conspicuous writing); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-316 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (stating
exclusion or modification of implied warranties by usage of trade are applicable to
merchants only); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316(5) (1991) (stating exclusions or
modifications of implied warranties are not applicable to sales of new consumer goods
or services); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62a.2-316(4) (1992) (providing that a limitation
on a merchant seller's liability for the sale of consumer goods will be effective only if
the disclaimer gives particularity about unwarranted qualities). Mississippi has chosen
not to include 2-316 or otherwise limit liability as to implied warranties of
merchantability or fitness. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-18 (1972).
12 6See, e.g., Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 625 P.2d 171, 173
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981). ("Disclaimers ... are not favored in the law[.]"); Lecates v. Pontiac
Buick Co., 515 A.2d 163, 168 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986) ("Since the ordinary presumption is
that the risk of nonmerchantability is never assumed by the buyer, its exclusion from a
contract threatens surprise and reasonably requires that a seller make special mention
of the word as a precaution against unfair advantage.").
12 7See, e.g., Country Clubs, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d 1347, 1397 (6th
Cir. 1978) (holding a purchase order entered by experienced business man gave notice
of warranty limitation); see also Hummel v. Skyline Dodge, Inc., 589 P.2d 73, 76 (Col. Ct.
App. 1978) (holding a professional car dealer's actions amounted to acceptance of
vehicle).
12 8See, e.g., Standard Structural Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 597 F. Supp. 164,
185 (D. Conn. 1984) (discussing assumption that "merchants" are experienced
professionals).
12 9But see Comment 8 addressing paragraph 3, subsection (b) and stating: "The
particular buyer's skill and the normal method of examining goods in the circumstances
determine what defects are excluded by the examination." U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 8 (1992).
130Cf. U.C.C. § 2-316 cmt. 3 (1992) which provides: "Disclaimer of the implied
warranty of merchantability is permitted under subsection (2), but with the safeguard
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gratuitously.131 In considering the positions of a commercial buyer and seller,
in light of their presumed experience as merchants, those courts have, in effect,
broadened the explicit criteria for interpreting and enforcing 2-316(3)(c).
Weighing a merchant's inexperience would be more useful than examining
experience. Unfamiliarity with trade usage exclusions of implied warranties is
relevant to a determination of the parties' bargain-in-fact. Despite a few courts'
reflections on a merchant's experience, the overwhelming trend is not to probe
this aspect.
Even experience gained in one's trade or profession does not, in itself, endow
a commercial buyer or seller with an understanding of warranties and
warranty disclaimers. Legal consultation is a prerequisite to that
understanding and, for commercial entities, it often makes the difference
between a company's survival or its demise. In effect, the utilization of counsel
can compensate for inadequate experience. Although there appear to be no
empirical studies on the subject, it is a probable misconception that all, or even
most, commercial sellers and buyers operate with the benefit of regular legal
counsel. Certain facts support this premise: standard forms predominate in
commercial transactions;132 warranties as protective devices remain an
essential feature of both consumer and commercial transactions; 133 most
businesses are small enterprises; 134 and lastly, the vast numbers of failed
that such disclaimers must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
conspicuous." Id.
131While it follows that only a merchant may make a disclaimer of an implied
warranty of merchantability since the warranty only arises through a sale by a merchant,
this is but one type of warranty disclaimer recognized under 2-316. And although
Comment 1 to 2-104 equates merchants with experienced professionals, not all courts
have adopted that view. See, e.g., Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cosmetics, Inc., 478
N.Y.S.2d 505, 512 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1984) ("[I]t is nonetheless apparent that small
businessmen can also be victimized by unconscionable practices.").
132 See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, (1971) ("Standard form contracts probably account for more
than ninety-nine percent of all the contracts now made.").
133 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1397 (1983)
(discussing whether warranties exist primarily for consumers as a gauge of product
quality according to "signalling theory," the authors contend that the frequency of
warranties in commercial markets belies the theory).
1341n 1988 seventy-five percent of business establishments paid wages to nine or fewer
employees with sixty-nine percent of all wholesale trade establishments employing nine
or fewer workers. These figures do not include self-employed persons whose businesses
would increase percentages substantially. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY
BusINEss PATTERNS X, 48 (1988). And while one company might operate several
establishments, thereby constituting a large business entity, other data minimize the
significance of this. See Note, Toward Greater Equality in Business Transactions: A Proposal
to Extend the Little FTC Acts to Small Businesses, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1628 (1983)
("[Liarge corporations represent only a tiny fraction of the total number of all business
firms.").
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businesses demonstrate undercapitalization as well as neglect in obtaining
preventive legal advice.135
The use of standard form contracts by merchants, who are also classifiable
as businesses or business enterprises, deserves closer scrutiny with regard to
disclaimers of warranties and merchants. The sellers in the cases cited in this
article satisfied the Code's definition of merchant,136 as did most of the
buyers.137 And in the majority of cases the disclaimers at issue were contained
in standard form contracts, invoices, order forms, or the like.
138
Criticism has been aimed at the use of standardized forms because they
preclude the opportunity for bargaining.139 A key objective of Article 2 is the
promotion of sales contracts resulting from the parties' agreement through a
bargaining process. One example of this focus is its less rigorous treatment of
13 5 See Philip Schuchman, The Average Bankrupt: A Description and Analysis of 753
Personal Bankruptcy Filings in Nine States, 88 CoMM. L. J. 288, 306 (1983) ("The largest of
the personal bankruptcies, as measured by the scheduled contractual liabilities and
gross assets, are the business-related filings.").
136U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1992) states:
"Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise
by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar
to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such know-
ledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or
other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill.
Id. In addition, U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (1992) states, in part: "Unless excluded or modified
(Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract
for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." Id.
13 7This article will not explore the debate over whether or when farmers should
qualify as merchants. See, e.g., FredJ. Moore, Inc. v. Schinmann, 700 P.2d 754,757 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1985) ("Whether a farmer is a merchant under the Uniform Commercial Code
is a question of fact unless the facts are undisputed."); see also Loeb & Co., Inc. v.
Schreiner, 321 So.2d 199 (Ala. 1975) (holding a farmer who sold only his own cotton was
not a merchant under 2-104).
138 Country Clubs, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 430 F.2d. 1347,1396 (6th Cir. 1970)
(order forms); Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638,644 (10th Cir. 1991) (invoices
and seed pail labels); Standard Structural Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 597 F. Supp.
164,173-74 (D. Conn. 1984) (letter and acknowledgement); Lecates v. Pontiac Buick Co.,
515 A.2d 163, 167 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986) ("used vehicle guarantee" and invoice);
Christopher and Son, Inc. v. Kansas Paint & Color Co., 523 P.2d 709, 715 (Kan. 1974)
(invoices); Latimer v. William Mueller & Son, 386 N.W.2d 618,624 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
(seed bag tags); Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale Trucking Corp., 268 A.2d 345, 347 (N.J.
1970) (contract clause); Velez v. Craine & Clarke Lumber, 341 N.Y.S.2d 248, 250 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1973) (invoice); Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 625 P.2d
171, 173 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (invoices).
13 9 See, e.g., K. N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 701 (1939) ("[W]hen
contracts are produced by the printing press, with the fountain pen used not for
recording thought but for authentication, the adequacy of the general law for filling
gaps in the conscious bargain is flatly negatived, in the view of the party preparing and
ordering the form pads.").
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forms than under the common law "mirror image" rule.140 If the absence of a
dispute arising from a seller and buyer's use of unmatched preprinted forms
indicates that little, if any, bargaining occurred (no typewritten terms have been
added, or confirmatory memoranda exchanged, for example), the model
contract envisaged by Article 2 and its drafters has been subverted. Likewise,
a seller who provides preprinted contract forms or invoices to a buyer who has
used the seller's order forms is in a weak position to argue that the language
of the forms was bargained for.14 1
Regarding merchants as persons knowledgeable about the goods they buy
or sell 142 overlooks sometimes extreme degrees of skill and ignorance existing
in contemporary commercial settings. 143 Subsection 2-316(3)(c) may make
some commercial sellers less conscientious in notifying a buyer of an implied
warranty disclaimer included on a standard form either drafted by counsel and
used repeatedly without review or purchased in tablet form. Likewise, it may
make some commercial buyers more vulnerable to the possible foreclosing of
a remedy by disclaimer. Both are consequences which will most likely occur to
the inexperienced or careless.144 Furthermore, such merchants may well
comprise the greater number of those conducting business.
B. Merchants and Unconscionability
The failure of merchant buyers and sellers to operate with the requisite
understanding of all the consequences of a warranty or warranty disclaimer
and the reasons therefore, invites a comparison of bargaining power. In the case
of a buyer, it is only "bargained language," i.e., agreement to the disclaimer as
required by Comment 1 to 2-316 and as interpreted by most courts, which
legitimizes the disclaimer. Although agreement alone does not signify equality
of bargaining power, and unequal bargaining power is not synonymous with
unfairness, Comment 1 to 2-316 implicitly raises the issue of fairness in its
attention to buyer protection. When inexperienced merchants bargain
140See U.C.C. § 2-207 (1992) (allowing for an acceptance to contain terms that differ
from the offer).
14 1See, e.g., Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex. 1991) (citing the
RESTATeENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 211 cmt. b (1981) (Spears, J., concurring). The
concurring opinion asserts that most buyers do not read standard form contracts. See
also W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Transformation of Contracts Law
by Standard Forms, 46 U. PImT. L. REV. 21, 34 (1984) (observing that even nonstandard
contracts may be as complex and incomprehensible as standard contracts).
14 2See supra notes 128 and 136 and accompanying text.
14 3See, e.g., Note, supra note 134 at 1629 (stating most small businesses are headed by
inexperienced entrepreneurs).
14 4Sellers who neglect to bring a disclaimer to a buyer's attention may be
inexperienced themselves or they may represent that class of seller who "respond[s] to
[buyers'] ignorance by offering more limited warranty coverage than the buyers want,
but charging prices that are commensurate with fuller coverage." ALAN SCHWARTZ &
ROBERT E. SCOTr, SALES LAW AND THE CONTRACTING PROCESS 183 (1992).
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unequally, the resulting agreement may contain an unfair, and therefore,
unconscionable disclaimer, notwithstanding a buyer's acceptance of the
term. 145
Section 2-316 does not expressly include fairness as a consideration in
determining the validity of a warranty disclaimer.146 Furthermore, no cases
cited herein have examined the unconscionability of a warranty exclusion or
modification even though some have examined it with regard to a remedy
limitation pursuant to 2-719.147
Despite the unlimited applicability of section 2-302 governing
unconscionability in contracts, 148 it would seem that few disclaimers in
commercial dealings are unconscionable.149 This makes little sense given that
the Code's model of the categorically experienced merchant remains
unproved. 150 Perhaps the reluctance to consider unconscionability of implied
warranty disclaimers, particularly those arising in the least structured manner,
derives from its clearer role under 2-719(3). 151 By including explicit language
145 See Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. PSI Cosmetic, Inc., 478 N.Y.S.2d 505, 512 (N.Y. Cir.
Ct. 1984) (providing that procedural unconscionability can result from, among other
things, a showing of "gross inequality of bargaining power").
146 See Richard D. Cudahy, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
47 MARQ. L. REV. 127, 143 (1963) ('The Code, itself, however, makes no provision in
section 2-316 for unfairness of disclaimers resulting from disparity of bargaining power
unless such disclaimers fail to provide the notice required by the section....").
147 See, e.g., Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638,646 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding
defendant's exclusion of consequential damages was unconscionable); see also Latimer
v. William Mueller & Son, 386 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) ("[L]imiting the
plaintiff's recovery to the purchase price of the seed would lead to an unconscionable
result.").
148U.C.C. § 2-302 (1992) provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract
to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse
to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract with-
out the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any
unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and
effect to aid the court in making the determination.
Id.; see also Barco, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 511 ("The question remains as to whether or not such
disclaimer [under 2-316(2)] is unconscionable, since it is nonetheless subject to judicial
scrutiny under UCC § 2-302.").
14 9See Michael J. Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty Disclaimers,
62 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199, 217-18 (1985) (citing WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 33, § 4-9 at
170). The author remarks that "Commercial deals between business professionals...
are quite likely to survive allegations of unconscionability."
150 See supra notes 132-44 and accompanying text.
15 1U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1992) states: "Consequential damages may be limited or
excluded unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequen-
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allowing a finding of unconscionability in limitations on consequential
damages, that subsection, which 2-316 references, appears to limit this
consideration to 2-719 alone. When courts have found the remedy limitations
to be unconscionable, they have also found the implied warranty disclaimer to
be ineffective. 152 The outcome has worked to the buyer's advantage making a
dual examination unnecessary.
The idea that buyers need greater protection than sellers in the case of an
implied warranty disclaimer may be well-founded if one theorizes that
warranties by definition mean goods of better quality and exclusions of
warranties mean goods of lesser quality. This theory, however, does not
necessarily lead to price adjustment for goods of lesser quality.153 Yet both of
those elements-potentially defective goods and price adjustment-are at the
heart of warranty exclusion negotiations. Statutory protection recognizes this
in a circuitous way. If the buyer would not be surprised by the disclaimer, the
parties will have negotiated price with the understanding of no warranty, or,
if price remains open, it can be set according to that understanding. Course of
dealing, course of performance, and trade usage disclaimers may present an
indistinct term which must be established other than by the parties' express
negotiations.
Because the cases overwhelmingly demonstrate that (3)(c)'s effectiveness
occurs when other disclaimer indicia exist, one can argue that the drafters may
have never intended this subsection to operate independently or even to play
a dominant role.154 Nonetheless, the language appears as a discrete mechanism
for excluding implied warranties. A seller's misplaced confidence in its
authority may be the result and, for the unwary buyer, it is poised as a sword
ready to strike.
Sellers have predictably used the section as support for or an alternative to,
the more "tangible" methods of excluding or modifying implied warranties. In
effect, sellers and their lawyers have used it as something held in reserve in the
event another device failed. While it is common for practitioners to draft
pleadings with alternative bases for relief, this provision may have relaxed the
ways in which sellers have otherwise attempted to disclaim warranties. In view
of continued disagreement over whether 2-316(2) is superior to (3), failure to
tial damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is commercial is not." Id.
152Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638, 646 (10th Cir. 1991); Latimer v.
William Mueller & Son, 386 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
153See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 149, at 251 (holding that buyers willing to accept a
disclaimer in exchange for a lower price will only have this option so long as the
disclaimers are enforceable).
154Cf. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 33, at 504 ("[Ejach of the alternative routes
depends to some extent on the circumstances surrounding the particular sale in
question: these are not absolute rules."); see also Lord, supra note 23, at 582-83
("Generally, the role that usage, dealing, and performance play in the exclusion of
implied warranties is residual.").
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act as if they were both equally essential and to observe meticulously every
standard has harmed sellers needlessly.155
It is misguided to believe that, in the case of commercial sale-of-goods
transactions, all, most, or even a majority of contracting parties customarily
discuss in detail terms included on preprinted forms. Beyond quantity, price,
and delivery schedules, agreement to other terms is largely by acquiescence.
The courts' disinclination to examine the unconscionability of warranty
disclaimers in contracts between merchants, however unsophisticated one or
both may be, leaves a wide margin for the uneven application of 2-316(3)(c),
the most formless of all the implied warranty disclaimers.
Against this background, the removal of 2-316(3)(c)'s prominence while
retaining its significance would more closely harmonize the belief and the
reality. The shift would occur first in the way sellers' attorneys draft their
disclaimers. Unable to rely on a separate statutory provision declaring the
availability of a course of dealing, course of performance, or trade usage
disclaimer, sellers' counsel will eventually be more attentive to the
requirements of (2) and (3)(a). Improving the enforceability of disclaimer
clauses likely to be used repeatedly by their clients is a benefit to the seller,156
who retains the option of pleading a course of dealing, performance, or trade
usage disclaimer through 1-205 and 2-208.157
Two potential benefits accrue to the buyer. First, the disclaimers resulting
from a changed emphasis to safeguard the seller's interests will, by their clarity
and conspicuousness, provide near-undisputed notice to a buyer. In turn, the
buyer has the choice of objecting to the disclaimer or obtaining adjustments
elsewhere in the contract. Second, those very factors which have caused smaller
merchant buyers to fail will diminish as sellers' contracts prevail in the area of
disclaimers and buyers begin to consult their attorneys on a regular basis.
Currently, subsection 2-316(3)(c) renders course of dealing, course of
performance, and trade usage factors undependable for sellers and unexpected
for buyers. Sellers and buyers then remain at the mercy of a court's discretion
in an area lacking consensus.
155See, e.g., Lecates v. Pontiac Buick Co., 515 A.2d 163, 168 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986)
(holdingno method of disclaiming under2-316(3) will compensate for failure to mention
"merchantability" when excluding that warranty); Zicari v. Joseph Harris Co., 304
N.Y.S.2d 918,924 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (failing to mention the word "merchantability"
in the written disclaimer and insufficient facts showing a trade usage exclusion
precluded summary judgment).
156 See, e.g., Slawson, supra note 141, at 24 ("Standard forms also enable a business to
make its risks of transacting more manageable by making them uniform for all its
transactions of a kind.").
157Other commentators have implied that (3)(c) is not the method of first choice for
disclaiming implied warranties. See, e.g., Lord, supra note 23, at 690 (suggesting if
implied warranties have not been disclaimed other than by dealing, performance, or
usage, these are nonetheless available to the seller's attorney as part of strategy "even
where there are better alternative arguments to be made").
[Vol. 41:1
26https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/3
DIMINISHING RETURNS
VII. REFRAMING DEALING, PERFORMANCE, AND USAGE DISCLAIMERS OF
IMPLIED WARRANTY
A. The Power of Perception
Viewed in the light of other disclaimer techniques, subsection 2-316(3)(c) has
been ancillary at best. Two ways to rehabilitate it are readily apparent. First,
the Comments could be revised to illustrate the subsection's independence
with examples and to clarify the introductory language of 2-316(3) as it relates
to 2-316(2). Second, the entire provision could be removed and replaced with
a Comment revision to emphasize the continued function of these three
elements in disclaiming warranties.
This article advocates the latter alternative. The difficulty with the first
method is one of perception. Retaining the subsection while elaborating on it
in the Comments will not transform its use in the minds of practitioners and
courts. The provision is prominent and, while clarifying language in the
Comments would cause some reform, changes in its application would be
negligible. As the courts have found remedy limitations unconscionable
pursuant to the unmistakable language of 2-719(3), while ignoring the potential
unconscionability of warranty disclaimers involving merchants, so will some
courts continue to regard 2-316(3)(c) as influential despite the confusion
surrounding its utility.
The deletion of 2-316(3)(c) would be immediately noteworthy generating
interest in the reasons for its removal. Thorough explanation in the Comments,
with emphasis on the continued relevance of these factors pursuant to 1-205
and 2-208, would be required. Achieving the desired effect-unchanged
recognition of disclaimer through course of dealing, course of performance, or
trade usage while calling for scrupulous attention to other disclaimer
methods-would depend upon the authority accorded the Comment.
B. The Weight of U.C.C. Comments
Differences of opinion as to the U.C.C. Comments' purpose abound.
Originally, the Comments were to be a substitute for the treatise which
followed the Uniform Sales Act and were written "to make clear what changes
were made in the law and why[.]"158 As Chief Reporter for the Code, Professor
Karl Llewellyn intended the Comments "to assist the courts in their application
of the Code by providing an authoritative guide to the purposes and reasons
for each section."159 Specific references to the Comments initially contained in
the Code were later deleted,160 but their still essential place in the Code has led
158Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM.
L. REV. 798, 809 (1958).
159A.B.A. Task Force, supra note 9, at 996.
160Braucher, supra note 158, at 809.
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to its characterization as a "'split level' statute... only one level of which has
been subjected to the full legislative process."161
Despite concern that courts do not invariably account for their reliance on
or disregard of a Comment,162 use of a Comment in this instance is justified. It
would not supplement or modify the statute.163 Its content would not expand
upon "textual uncertainties."164 Its utility would serve as a reminder of the
additional grounds for implied warranty disclaimers consonant with sections
1-205 and 2-208.
Additionally, other sections of the Code exist which include course of
dealing, course of performance, and trade usage as instructional elements of
the Comment while omitting them from the statutory language. Section 2-301
states: "The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of the
buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract."165 The Comment
to that section states: "In order to determine what is 'in accordance with the
contract' under this Article usage of trade, course of dealing and performance,
and the general background of circumstances must be given due consideration
.... "166 Cross references to 1-205 and 2-208 follow. Comment 2 to section
2-106(2) likewise elaborates on the statutory definition of conforming goods by
including usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance as
relevant factors. That statutory section, like 2-301, does not itself contain similar
language.167 At least one court followed the spirit of the Comments to both
2-310 and 2-106(2).168
Specific changes in section 2-316 should include the deletion of paragraph
(c) from subsection 2-316(3) and from Comment 6. The following sentence
should be added to that Comment: "Additional circumstances which will
notify the buyer that implied warranties have been excluded or modified are
to be found in the parties' course of dealing, course of performance, or in usage
of trade." Finally, the last sentence of Comment 7 should be rewritten to read:
161 REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 173 (1975).
162 A.B.A. Task Force, supra note 9, at 996.
163 Cf. Dickerson, supra note 161, at 146-47 ("Most of comment 9 to section 2-615 ... is
clearly no part of proper legislative context, because rather than clarify the section it
attempts to set forth additional rules of law.").
164 Cf. Dickerson, supra note 161, at 159 (noting that Comment 3 to section 2-318
removes the privity requirement in actions against retailers while implying nothing
about its applicability to wholesalers or manufacturers).
165U.C.C. § 2-301 (1992).
166U.C.C. § 2-301, cmt. (1992).
167U.C.C. § 2-106(2) (1992) provides: "Goods or conduct including any part of a
performance are 'conforming' or conform to the contract when they are in accordance
with the obligations under the contract."
16 8Evco Distributing, Inc. v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 627 P.2d 374 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1981).
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"The terms covered by paragraph (a) merely particularize exclusion or
modification of implied warranties by usage of trade."
Because there can be no way of predicting a court's observance of a
Comment, a more uniform treatment of implied warranty disclaimers through
course of dealing, course of performance, and trade usage in keeping with this
article's recommendation remains uncertain. Little is to be gained, however, by
abandoning this warranty disclaimer to its current disordered state.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Judicial discretion has rendered U.C.C. section 2-316(3)(c) a misleading
subsection for both buyers and sellers. The provision can stand alone, but it
rarely does. When sellers employ it as support for sometimes carelessly
prepared written disclaimers, they face only an even chance that it will succeed
in reinforcing their claims or defenses. Buyers may find themselves remiss in
what they should have known and, consequently, except for certain categories
of sales transactions in which trade usage disclaimers are indisputably the
norm, may face the not quite unfair surprise of warranty exclusion by course
of dealing, performance, or trade usage. The indirect documentation showing
widespread inexperience among merchants increases this probability while
judicial reluctance to examine such disclaimers for unconscionability ignores
trends, if not realities, in the marketplace.
Benefits to both sellers and buyers will result when attention paid to the
details of implied warranty disclaimers generally becomes more crucial to a
sales transaction. Relegating implied warranty exclusions or modifications
under 2-316(3)(c) to a status approximating an afterthought as the cases
indicate some parties have done has devitalized the provision and invites
reform. A clearer understanding of the interdependence between 2-316(2) and
(3), the judicial signalling of stricter standards for a disclaimer under (2)
whenever disclaimers from dealing, performance, or usage are asserted, and
the reestablishment of 1-205 and 2-208 as the principal references for such
disclaimers would add order to what is now an indeterminate body of law.
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